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Abstract 
 
 
Military campaigns in the 21st Century are extremely complex 
multi-dimensional undertakings. In today’s globalized reality, 
influence of wars will go beyond the theatre of operations into 
issues of international economy, human migration, airspace and sea 
lanes, thus adding new dimensions to campaign planning.  
Converting theory and doctrine to practice is never easy.  Realistic 
training may be the best bridge to ensure that classroom knowledge 
is correctly applied to the real battlefield.  This paper looks at this 
challenge through the combined experience of six foreign exchange 
students who graduated from Indonesia’s Air Command and Staff 
College, 2018.  The purpose of this paper is to highlight some of the 
challenges to campaign planning, especially in light of 
multinational influences, extract lessons learned from recent 
military campaigns and then provide feedback for Indonesia’s 
wargaming training methodology as practiced in the air command 
and staff college.  The foundation to Indonesia’s wargaming 
exercises is the 14-step Military Decision Making Process 
(MDMP).  MDMP in its general form is part of the campaign 
planning processes for the authors’ respective countries too, varying 
only in the sequence and emphasis on steps and tasks within the 
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process and strategies for exercising the process.  This paper will 
conclude that even the most theoretically sound campaign planning 
process would lead to operational failure, unless critical thinking & 
planning abilities are developed in upcoming military leaders 
through a sound understanding of theory, realistic wargaming, and 
deep analysis. This requires realistic training in an open learning 
environment, and a willingness to analyse one’s own country-
specific mistakes and successes.  
© 2018 Published by Indonesia Defense University   
 
INTRODUCTION 
Theory and doctrine provide the 
intellectual foundation for military 
operations, without which it would be a 
directionless waste of human life and 
resources. That being said, studying theory 
and applying doctrine is necessary, but not 
sufficient to ensure a successful military 
campaign.  Realistic training, true 
jointness and wise application of doctrine 
are the prerequisites to transform theory 
into practice of an effective campaign.   
There are at least two reasons why 
learning theory and doctrine is not enough 
to train effectively, much less execute a 
military campaign.  One, theory and 
doctrine lack the field realism and fog of 
war.  Two, overly general military doctrine 
may not directly apply to a country’s 
military/strategic context, given their 
particular equipment or capability 
constraints.  
This leads us to the research question to 
be answered in this paper.  How does one 
translate military doctrine and theory into 
successful military campaign planning and 
execution?  This paper hypothesises that 
realistic training, which deeply considers 
one’s own military history and context, is 
a necessary but not sufficient effort to 
bridge the gap between theory and 
practice.   
Military education institutions, 
especially ones that groom mid-ranking 
officers for command positions and 
operational planning roles, should teach 
more than theory, doctrine and the types of 
military operations.  The training must be 
realistic, learning from successes and 
failures of their own military operations in 
the classroom, with a focus on dynamic 
analysis in the exercise phase of education.   
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
The qualitative approach used in this paper 
will begin by discussing the theory of 
military campaign planning, considering 
some similarities and differences between 
national approaches.  The secondary 
sources and national doctrine of select 
countries will then lead into an analysis of 
two case studies: Desert Storm (1991), and 
the Saudi campaign in Yemen (2015 to 
present).  The campaign examples will 
highlight key principles of campaign 
planning while also pinpointing challenges 
in execution.   
The qualitative approach then makes 
use of a participant observation method to 
discuss the importance of the Military 
Decision-Making Process (MDMP) as part 
of campaign planning, and analyse the 
strengths and weaknesses of MDMP in 
general, but also with reference to 
Indonesia’s Air Command and Staff 
College education and training approach.  
The participant observation was completed 
by all six paper authors not only as full-
time Indonesian Command and Staff 
College students but specifically, as active 
participants in three, week-long 
wargaming sessions as part of the school 
curriculum.  
The discussion in this paper touches 
mostly on the strategic level with 
applicable operational considerations.  
Aside from the source documents, peer-
reviewed journal citations and participant 
observation, this paper’s unique approach 
benefits from the authors’ previous 
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operational experience and their year-long 
participation at Seskoau.   
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Theory and Doctrine of Military 
Campaigns 
A military campaign is defined as 
prolonged military action with a regional 
or strategic objective, incorporating a large 
number of troops usually as a part of a 
greater war effort.  A campaign consists of 
a number of battles or force-on-force 
engagements from a single country or a 
collection of countries, usually employing 
joint or combined operations. A military 
campaign can be fought by a single 
country’s military inside its sovereign 
borders, as did Malaysia in the 1960s, or it 
can be as large as a multinational force 
fighting outside each contributing 
country’s border, as is the case in 
Afghanistan. 
The geographic scope and participation 
are important to clarify because different 
countries have different experiences, 
histories and regulations that influence 
their respective perceptions of military 
campaigns.  Some nations, like Indonesia, 
have yet to formulate a precise law 
defining how their forces would engage in 
a campaign outside its borders.  In 
addition, strictly non-aligned states, like 
Indonesia and India, and states that eschew 
alliances, like Singapore, might engage in 
multinational campaigns but under special 
political agreements outside of a treaty 
alliance.   
In the 21st century, given advances in 
technology, globalization and 
irregular/hybrid warfare, it is very unlikely 
that one country’s campaign would not 
affect a neighbouring country or 
international organization, especially 
considering displaced persons and inter-
dependant economies. While military 
doctrines are a guideline to developing 
strategic and operational actions, military 
campaigns must consider more than just 
blunt military strategy. Now, campaign 
planning must also consider multinational 
dynamics and cross-border impacts of 
conflict.  As such, this essay will focus on 
the general theory, doctrine, training and 
application of military campaigns, 
assuming at the very least, multinational 
coordination.   
Participation in military campaigns, 
whether national or multinational, are 
greatly influenced by politics.  As a result 
of the legal and political constraints of 
each state, their involvement in military 
campaigns may have varying degrees of 
participation: from observer, medical 
assistance and logistics support to combat 
air operations and Special Forces direct 
action (US Joint Doctrine, 2013).  A core 
element of planning a campaign is buy-in 
and support.  No support, no matter how 
little should be rejected outright, especially 
in the politically diverse, culturally 
sensitive environment of a multinational 
force.  
Common Elements to Campaign 
Planning  
In writing this essay, the six authors drew 
on military thinking from their respective 
nations and their own professional 
experience and found that some of the 
most important and common elements in 
campaign planning are as follows: 
Defining a Clear End-State 
This is the first question posed in 
campaign planning and requires the most 
comprehensive response (Clausewitz, 
1976).   The motive/need for war will 
determine both the military objective and 
the amount of effort committed.    The 
construction of strategy begins with 
identifying the war’s aim, 
because, “the aim will determine the series 
of actions intended to achieve it.”   War is 
fought for politically determined purposes, 
and not merely as a clash of arms for its 
own sake.  There is often a goal beyond 
simply winning the military conflict.  
Thus, the planner attempting to tie the 
military end to the prime objective/s must  
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Figure 1. National Strategic Planning.  
Source: Linking DIMEFIL/ PMESII to a Theory of Victory, April 2009 
 
not only understand how the two 
interrelate, but also must track the logic 
behind each of the dozens of tasks being 
orchestrated, ensuring a unity of purpose. 
It is sometimes difficult to define a 
precise military end state during the 
planning stages due to the numerous 
unknowns.  The operational commanders 
of today are faced with situations far more 
complicated than those faced by their 
predecessors. Further, they must be adept 
at working in concert not only with other 
government organizations, but Non-
Government Organizations (NGO) and 
Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) as 
well to achieve national aims.   
In spite of the commander's best efforts 
to secure a defined end state prior to the 
beginning of the operation, it is very 
possible that they will find themselves 
directing military forces and working 
toward the completion of objectives while 
still lacking either a defined end-state or an 
exit strategy (Strines E. J, 1997).   Exit 
strategies between multinational forces are 
even more challenging and should be 
flexible enough to overcome friction and 
ensure a desired political end-state that can 
be translated into a viable military strategy 
(Fleck C. M., 1997).  
Unity of Command 
As per Sun Tzu, one of the five important 
parameters of victory is the organization of 
the military, and central to that construct is 
to establish unity of command.   Along 
with centralized command, Sun Tzu 
believed in decentralized execution of the 
military campaign; sub-commanders 
executing their orders without interference 
from above especially when the higher 
authority has no specific knowledge 
regarding situations in the field (Dimovski, 
2012).   
From a US perspective, US army 
doctrine, FM 101-5, describes unity of 
command in practice beginning with clear 
guidance and objectives, including stated 
key tasks to unite all actions of supporting 
forces in a military campaign (Walter N. 
Anderson, 1998). US Joint doctrine, JP 3-
0, Joint Operations, defines unity of 
command as an essential element of 
command and control and a requisite for 
achieving unity of effort, defined as 
coordination and cooperation toward 
Alok, Bahaizil, Barter, Fahad, O’Hara, Slayton/Jurnal Pertahanan Vol. 4 No. 3 (2018) pp.162-177 
166 
 
common objectives, even if the 
participants are not necessarily part of the 
same organization (Bury S., 2014).   
Basic Indian airpower doctrine 
recognises an important fact about 
evolving doctrine, that  
“In the future, there is a likelihood of 
large and varied forces including 
non-military elements being 
employed; hence unity of command 
may not be feasible at all times. It is 
here that coordination and 
cooperation between different 
agencies becomes the guiding 
principle. Joint planning, training, a 
clear perspective about the 
functioning of the other services and 
the establishment of supportive 
organisations will be essential to 
ensure synergy.” 
Local, Partner, Foreign and Ally Support 
Three types of diplomatic arrangements 
strengthen a defence posture: collective 
security systems, defensive alliances, and 
balancing behaviour by neutral states (Van 
Evera, 1998).  In theory, states in a 
collective security system, such as the 
former League of Nations, promise mutual 
aid against aggression by any party 
member. Neutral states act as balancers 
when they join the weaker of two 
competing coalitions to restore balance 
between them.   Coalitions have proven 
useful in building limited multilateral 
political consensus for military action, 
when global UN Security Council 
consensus or a formal alliance does not 
exist.   
Most importantly, no country’s 
military, plans and executes a campaign in 
a vacuum.  At the very least they must 
integrate with civilian authorities in 
security, health or transportation sectors.  
For example, a crucial, and often difficult 
management step is airspace coordination.  
Even within a coalition, operations have 
shown a lack of partner coordination in 
C4ISR            (Command,              Control,  
Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance), collaborative 
planning and the sharing of airspace 
information etc.  In Desert Storm, a case 
study discussed later, failures in airspace 
management resulted in 11 of the US 
military’s 35 ‘friendly fire’ casualties, 
which equates to 7.5% of total combat 
deaths (Barton Gellman, 1991).  
Access and Logistics 
This category is closely related to the 
above.  Access and proximity to the area 
of operations are crucial for military 
success.  The military footprint should be 
as small as possible and consider the 
environment, relying on local and 
multinational integration to achieve the 
campaign objectives.  Access, especially in 
a campaign conducted farther way from 
the military’s logistical hubs, usually 
requires diplomatic cooperation, 
temporary military bases and the 
agreements with host nation.  Even 
campaigns executed within one’s own 
national borders must consider the 
economic strain of wartime logistics, and 
the physical and sociological impact of a 
large military footprint.   
Standardization and Interoperability 
Between Services and Nations 
Standardization and interoperability refer 
to shared communication procedures, 
similar processes in reporting and 
information dissemination and even 
technical and mechanical compatibility 
between pieces of military equipment. 
While essential, standardization and 
interoperability is not something that can 
be achieved only days, even months before 
executing a campaign.  One of the best 
ways to ensure standardization is to train 
using the tactics, techniques and 
procedures described in doctrine.  
Multinational forces must consider the 
extent of sharing equipment or even 
sharing and combining doctrine to 
harmonise procedural differences.   
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Comparison of Campaign Planning 
Approaches 
Considering the general theory of 
campaign planning, multinational 
operations must acknowledge slight 
variations or sources of influence in each 
country’s military doctrines.  The 
following are some of the differences in 
approach or priority campaign planning 
perspectives in the United States, 
Australia, India and Singapore. 
In terms of interoperability planning, 
the United States and Australia place a 
high priority on transparency in military 
doctrine.  The US military’s own doctrine 
has been adopted in part by many 
militaries around the globe as a result of 
this transparency, which in turn optimizes 
interoperability.  Australia is open in 
sharing doctrine and planning processes 
with regional neighbours and allies, 
especially in humanitarian response 
efforts.  In contrast, Singapore is less open 
with its doctrine manuals, but not at the 
expense of coalition synergy.  Singapore 
has successfully led joint operations like 
anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and 
contributed significantly to NATO-led 
campaigns in Afghanistan.  
Both Singapore and India are countries 
that are reluctant to enter treaty alliances.  
For India, it is part of its long-standing 
non-aligned (NAM) policy.  For joint 
operations, India uses the Joint Operations 
Planning Process (JOPP) and for air 
campaigns, the Air Operations Planning 
Process (AOPP).  India’s long-term goal is 
to solidify a structure of fluid joint 
operations between its services 
(Mukherjee, 2017).  For Singapore, the 
concept of operations is centred around 
Task Forces which have different elements 
assigned for operational control. 
In contrast to Singapore and India, US 
defence doctrine relies specifically on a 
defence policy of coalitions and treaty 
partners.  Australia’s defence concerns are 
more closely related to its immediate 
surroundings, maintaining defence 
alliances with numerous nations and 
multilateral parties such as the Australia-
New Zealand-US alliance (ANZUS) and 
the Five Power Defence Arrangements 
(FPDA) comprising Australia, New 
Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and the UK. 
 
Military Campaign Example: Iraq 1990 
- 1991 
Previous to the US 1991 invasion of Iraq, 
the US military corrected gross errors in 
joint force planning and execution during 
conflicts in the 1980s like Grenada and 
Panama.  The Gulf War (2 August 1990 – 
28 February 1991), was comprised of two 
phases.  The first was a military 
mobilization for the defence of Saudi 
Arabia, Operation Desert Shield (2 August 
1990 – 17 January 1991). The actual 
fighting took place in the second phase, 
Operation Desert Storm (17 January 1991 
– 28 February 1991). A coalition force 
consisting of troops from 35 nations, led 
by the United States, fought against Iraq in 
order to counter and repel Iraq's invasion 
of Kuwait and prevent Iraq’s further 
aggression into Arabia. 
The campaign planning began well in 
advance, based on assessments and 
forecasting processes. The UN Security 
Resolutions 661 (Economic sanctions on 
Iraq), 665 (Naval blockade) and 678 
(ultimatum to Iraq for withdrawal from 
Kuwait), laid the groundwork on which the 
actual military campaign was founded. 
The campaign planning was as much 
political as it was operational.  Consistent 
with US strategy, the planning phase 
emphasized rationalization and 
standardization between coalition forces.  
The majority of the coalition forces were 
from the US. Saudi Arabia, the UK and 
Egypt. Operation Desert Storm began with 
an aerial and naval bombardment 
campaign – lasting five weeks, followed 
by a ground invasion, which resulted in a 
victory within 100 hours. Seen this way, 
Operation Desert Storm was one of the 
most successful campaigns in modern 
history. 
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It is often the case that the planning 
process for big wars is often muddled by 
lack of political vision or inadequately 
articulated strategic objectives. In this 
case, the political decision-making process 
was mature and timely. The cohesion 
between the national leaders of the 
Coalition governments also helped make 
the process efficient. 
The naval forces mobilized in the 
Persian Gulf consisted of six carrier battle 
groups. Total coalition force consisted of 
956,600 troops. The air campaign involved 
2,780 fixed wing aircraft, flying 18,466 air 
deployment missions, and nearly 116,000 
combat air missions, demonstrating the 
size and scale of the campaign. 
The force structure was combined joint 
in nature, right from the beginning. The 
CENTCOM (Central Command) and 
CJCS (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff) worked together at all stages and all 
levels, and included other Coalition force 
commanders. The Command Relationship 
Hierarchy can be seen in attachment 3. To 
achieve the stated end-state, a concise 
four-phase campaign was planned as 
follows:  
Phase I: Strategic Air Campaign against 
Iraq; Phase II:    Kuwait Air Campaign 
against Iraqi air forces in the Kuwait; 
Phase III: Ground Combat Power Attrition 
to neutralize the Republican Guards and 
isolate the Kuwait battlefield; and Phase 
IV:  Ground Attack, to eject Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait. 
Some important aspects of campaign 
planning are briefly analysed in this 
section. The military objectives were 
derived from the President's objectives. 
Unity of command and standardization 
were established across the complete 
coalition force, through mutual trust, 
respect and close coordination.  
One of the most important steps in the 
MDMP is analysing CoGs and possible 
enemy courses of action. The coalition 
spent substantial effort on analysing the 
operational environment, identifying the 
CoG and developing an operational plan 
accordingly.  A targeting model was 
developed by the Air Staff's deputy 
director of plans (CHECKMATE team), 
which planned to concentrate airpower in a 
massive air campaign. Take for example, 
the plan to destroy 84 Iraqi strategic 
targets in a single week. This plan would 
gain air superiority quickly, paralyze Iraqi 
leadership, degrade their military 
capabilities and neutralize their will to 
fight. As a lesson learned from the 1970s 
and 1980s, US national leadership 
meddled less in tactical and operational 
execution.  
At the sub-commander level, American 
military culture had evolved since the 
Vietnam War days through reforms carried 
out by Gen. Bill Creech. It now 
encouraged units to report actual states of 
readiness and shortcomings, which led to 
realistic campaign planning.  As a staple of 
US doctrine, Rules of Engagement were 
clearly established and passed on to 
operational commanders.  The 
combination of good leadership and 
streamlined communication meant that 
tactical decisions could be made more 
speedily than ever before. 
With a concise plan and end-state in 
place, coalition forces could train and 
exercise accordingly.  Such planning 
allowed for realistic campaign 
preparations.  The Iraqi forces, on the 
other hand, held totally generic exercises 
based on outdated intelligence and 
incorrect assumptions of US doctrine. 
While the coalition forces were 
equipped with the most advanced military 
weaponry, to include Joint Stars for 
location enemy positions, Compass Call 
for rapid fire support, Electronic Attack, 
aerial refuelling and airborne Command 
and Control (C2) platforms (AWACS), it 
was practice and planning that created the 
force-multiplying effect.  Effective joint 
training meant that during execution, the 
ground and air components understood 
how to better communicate and integrate. 
The logistics portion of the campaign 
was enabled by staff, knowledgeable about 
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the complexities campaign and the 
maintenance requirements for each 
platform, and capable of handling 
substantial data and material flows.  
Air supremacy allowed Coalition land, 
sea and air forces to manoeuvre and fight 
as they desired. It validated the concept of 
a campaign in which air power, applied 
precisely against centres of gravity, 
significantly degraded enemy capabilities 
– simultaneously at strategic, operational 
and tactical levels. At the ground level, the 
ability to conduct large, complex, multi-
mission, multi-mix missions was made 
possible by planning, staff work and 
coordination of highest order, ably 
supported by technology and 
organizational climate. A bureaucratic 
approach, or slow information 
processing/decision making is inadequate 
for a modern military campaign. 
This campaign again reinforced the 
lessons of earlier wars (e.g. Bekka Valley 
’82) regarding the centrality of technology, 
intelligence and Electronic warfare.  Space 
systems support is essential in today’s 
wars. Campaign planners must be trained 
to be able to take the full advantage space 
based capabilities. These ‘force 
multipliers’ enable a relatively small 
number of offensive assets to execute 
much bigger attacking roles than with 
conventional platforms.  
There are also certain shortcomings 
observed from the study of Desert Storm 
that offer valuable lessons. Modern 
technology that proved so effective is also 
very expensive. Most nations do not have 
those kinds of resources, hence they would 
need to plan with a mix of high and low 
tech weapon systems. In addition, a 
campaign waged by a more powerful 
military may cause greater than optimum 
amount of damage, which has long-term 
fallout for the entire population of the 
affected country, such as the destruction of 
electrical facilities in Iraq. In such actions 
often lie the seeds for civilizational 
animosity and future conflict.  A concise 
end-state does not necessarily translate to 
assured post-war stability. 
The use of Warden’s Model (CoG 
Identification process), while effective 
overall, was not as decisive as predicted. 
The targeting strategy based on this 
process did not achieve the desired effect 
to destroy the will of Iraqi leadership, and 
required modifications. Further, the target 
nomination process often saw inter-service 
disagreements. A possible solution is to 
have representatives from all arms at the 
Joint Force Component Command from 
the beginning, so that the needs of ground 
forces can be better attended to. 
Shortcomings were also felt in 
obtaining Battle Damage Assessments, 
which need to be addressed by all 
militaries to enhance the effectiveness of 
their planning process. 
Finally, despite the latest in technology, 
intelligence proved inadequate in locating 
mobile Scud launchers. The TLAM cruise 
missile also proved its worth as a long 
distance, accurate weapon. These are 
indicators of future trends in weapon 
platforms. More countries are expected to 
acquire ballistic missiles and will be 
prepared to use them in future conflicts, 
necessitating new doctrines and missile 
defence systems. 
The standout feature of the Desert 
Storm Campaign was that the political 
leaders understood the process. They 
played their role effectively, and allowed 
space for each component and military 
commander at each level to also play their 
roles. At the operational level, Desert 
Storm demonstrated the effectiveness of a 
focused joint campaign. The theatre 
campaign strategy exploited wise 
investments in technology, superior 
planning, training and doctrine to achieve 
overwhelming battlefield superiority. The 
campaign succeeded through cohesive 
organization and application of all forms 
of military power. This was facilitated by a 
coordinated, cohesive, well-thought out, 
integrated campaign planning process. 
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Military Campaign Example: Yemen 
2015 - Present 
The current Saudi Campaign in Yemen, 
which began in 2015, is a good 
contemporary example of challenges in 
military campaign planning and execution.   
As in most cases, it is important to 
emphasize the political dynamics of this 
campaign.  The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia’s stated military objective is to 
restore Mansour Hadi’s political authority 
as president after former Yemeni 
president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, took back 
power with the help of Houthi rebels.  
Having formerly been ousted in 2011, 
Hadi’s supporters and Houthi rebels 
succeeded in controlling large portions of 
northern Yemen and controlling Sanaa.  
The Saudi military motive is also 
influenced by the fact that Iran is 
suspected of directly assisting the Houthi 
movement.    
In terms of rationalization and regional 
support, the Saudi coalition received 
logistical and intelligence support from the 
US, UK and France, to include weapons 
and ammunition acquisitions. Saudi Arabia 
attempted to rally as much international 
support as possible, coordinating access, 
airspace and logistics support.  Almost 
three years of fighting appears to have 
entrenched both sides, while three UN-
organized efforts to negotiate a peace deal 
have failed (BBC, 2018).  
The planning and execution of 
Operation Decisive Storm and its follow-
on Operation Restoring Hope can be 
considered from at least these three 
principles of military campaigns: unity of 
command and interoperability; access and 
placement; information dissemination and 
intelligence analysis.  
In terms of unity of command, the 
Saudi led coalition commanders formed a 
combined Coordination, Communication, 
and Integration Centre (C3IC) for coalition 
decision-making. The C3IC was a joint, 
combined organization which had the 
primary focus of coordinating the coalition 
efforts from each contributing force.  The 
C3IC was headed by a Saudi Army Major 
General. The C3IC consisted of a number 
of Army, Navy, Air Force officers, and a 
Saudi contingent. The focus was primarily 
on land operations. Another C2 decision 
that improved the clarity of the 
commander’s guidance came in the form 
of a Force Instructions Document, 
outlining in more detail the Operation 
Order. 
In terms of communication and 
interoperability, mission planning sessions 
standardized the data-link architecture and 
system employment with face-to-face 
participant engagement. The C2 structure 
and data-link architecture (joint and 
combined) employed sufficient scope and 
complexity to warrant maximum  
 
Figure 2. Yemen Conflict Map, 2017 
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preplanning and briefing among 
participants. This was especially important 
where primary interface participants were 
involved, eg Tactical Air Control Centre 
(TACC), Airborne Early Warning and 
Control System (AWACS) and U.S. Navy 
(USN) assets.  
Access and placement of the TACC 
Message Processing Centre (MPC), which 
functioned as the Interface Control Unit 
(ICU), the AWACS planning cell, and 
naval assets in port, afforded an excellent 
opportunity for a rapid and effective 
mutual planning effort. Planning sessions 
attempted to ensure overlapping AWACS 
coverage but was often limited due to lack 
of input from key ICU players, familiar 
with the tactical constraints of the 
AWACS. The Command and Control (C2) 
operators and battle management 
personnel were crucial to ensuring all units 
were aware of what link information was 
available to them and capabilities that each 
air, ground and naval platform offered to 
create the best C2 picture for the 
warfighting.   
Despite possessing some of the most 
advanced technology along with a 
coalition of ready partners, there were 
numerous challenges to planning and 
conducting the Saudi military campaign in 
Yemen.  First, in terms of C2, due to 
coordination challenges, operations did not 
always take full advantage of the 
capabilities and situational awareness that 
was available to them. Data-link-capable 
aircraft and pilots were not always trained 
on how best to use the capabilities 
available to their agency on the digital data 
links. As a result, the desired sequence of 
tactical tasks to detect, track, and evaluate 
the threat, followed by friendly forces 
acting to neutralise the threat, often failed.  
Even though unity of command was 
maintained at the C3IC, Commander’s 
guidance and orders to subordinate units 
and coordination between coalition 
partners were not always received.   
Secondly, rules that specified the Law 
of Armed Conflict (LOAC), were initially 
separate or only supplemental to the basic 
elements of the operational order.  Legal 
considerations were later applied to every 
operational planning step and incorporated 
into the military decision-making process.  
It was crucial to convey the significant 
risks of collateral damages and other 
humanitarian concerns connected to each 
strike mission (“Decision Making Process 
in Military Combat Operations,” 2013).   
Third, it was initially a challenge to 
establish a commonality of information 
and intelligence functions to analyse the 
enemy’s capabilities and vulnerabilities.  
In short, it was difficult to identify the 
enemy’s CoG, a crucial step in the military 
decision-making process in campaign 
planning.  To overcome this challenge, the 
coalition designed an Analysis Cell 
devoted to not only defining the enemy’s 
CoG but suggesting the legal status of 
potential targets and possible enemy 
courses of action, which facilitated 
campaign planning and management.   
Fourth, similar to the enemy forces cell, 
the Saudi coalition developed a Friendly 
Forces Cell which brought together the 
actual capabilities and limitations of the 
coalition forces, in order to achieve unity 
of aim as per commander’s mission 
guidance. This Cell also maintained 
situation awareness on all friendly forces, 
enabling SAR, humanitarian responses and 
support to local population.   
Finally, the lack of realistic field 
training and live-fire exercises prior to the 
Yemeni campaign meant that Saudi pilots 
were unprepared for their targeting 
challenges.  Many of the mistakes initially 
committed by the Saudi coalition were the 
result of poor and unrealistic training.  
Pilots built expertise through trial and 
error, in the middle of war.  As the Saudi 
contribution noted from personal 
experience, today’s Saudi pilot lieutenants 
often have more skill and are better trained 
than Majors and Lieutenant Colonels.  
While war is the ultimate training ground, 
realistic training remains the only 
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substitute for operational preparation and 
readiness.   
 
Military Decision-Making Process: 
Training for Reality  
In light of the two real-world examples 
above, it is evident that proper planning, 
using a realistic military decision process, 
is crucial to military campaign success.  
Generally speaking, the critical elements 
of successful military decision-making 
exercises are as follows. Firstly, clear and 
deliberate objectives for participants and 
planners. This alone will enable 
supervisors to assess the degree of 
effectiveness of the exercise conducted. 
These objectives could focus on 
deliverables, processes, strategic, 
operational or tactical level concerns, but 
doing all at once may be cumbersome. A 
separate exercise objective might test the 
internal and external communication 
linkages for coordination in the execution.  
Secondly, criteria for good training 
comes in an environment that encourages 
critical and creative thinking, and where 
the established thinking can be logically 
questioned.  Wargaming provides for a 
safe and insulated environment for players 
to explore different Courses of Action 
(CoA) and to evaluate the risks and 
feasibility of certain actions and 
operational choices.  
Thirdly, training must be as realistic as 
possible.  One such necessary element of 
realism is communication linkages 
between elements; both within the military 
structure, as well as outside the military 
structure, with Government Organizations, 
NGOs and International Organizations 
(IO).  Exercising these linkages brings 
awareness that a military operation is not 
conducted in a vacuum.  
Fourthly, the use of technology should 
mirror the setup in an actual campaign.  
The weapon and resource assumptions 
must be realistic for feasible scenarios to 
emerge. These include the ways and means 
messages and orders are communicated. 
The key factors here would be reliability, 
security and speed. In addition, the 
training exercise should make use of 
technology to enhance learning value and 
realism by using simulation systems 
during presentation and evaluation.  
Finally, depending on the objectives 
laid out for a training exercise, more often 
than not, there will need to be an 
opposition force; the simulated enemy. 
The simulated enemy should be a 
thinking/responsive enemy, ensuring that 
CoAs (Courses of Action) are properly 
evaluated. This also enhances the realism 
of the exercise.  
As experienced and observed by this 
paper’s authors, the Seskoau training 
approach focuses on two main 
instructional areas: theory & doctrine, and 
Command Post Exercises (CPX) to 
practice practical application of the theory.  
The CPXs take the form of a wargame, 
while theory and doctrine are expounded 
in the classroom.   The theoretical aspect 
focuses on the existing doctrines of the 
TNI and its respective arms. TNI doctrine 
forms the basis of the TNI’s roles, 
responsibilities and types of operations 
that are conducted.  
The lectures are conducted by both 
organic staff as well as visiting lecturers 
who are considered subject matter experts. 
The lectures are informative, but based 
only on the published doctrines. The 
learning outcomes would improve if these 
lectures were supported and contextualized 
by recent Indonesian military examples.  
The TNI’s fourteen-step MDMP 
contains many of the same elements found 
in military planning approaches in other 
militaries.  Shared elements include: 
receiving a task, analysing the task, 
formulating military responses (Courses of 
Action – CoA) to the task, choosing the 
best CoA and finally, issuing task 
execution orders.  The process is designed 
to be used for both immediate and 
deliberate planning.  In reality, the time it 
takes to complete the process is dependent 
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on the enemy’s actions and one’s own 
leadership priorities.    
The generic planning process is 
designed to be domain-agnostic, meaning 
it can be as easily utilized by air, land or 
naval planning teams or indeed by sub-
elements and joint forces within a domain. 
From the perspective of the contributing 
authors, the similarities in all military 
decision-making models is readily 
apparent when studying any of the main 
military doctrines for decision-making, 
such as the US Military Decision-Making 
Process (MDMP); the British Estimate 
Process; the Indian Joint Operations 
Planning Process (JOPP); or the Australian 
Joint Military Appreciation Process 
(JMAP). All of these processes follow the 
generic planning sequence described 
previously, sometimes with only slight 
differences in terminology.   
One additional element that runs 
concurrent with the planning process is 
information gathering and assessment.  
Despite the clean, logical appearance of an 
MDMP, wartime realities and certainly 
real enemies, will shift positions and 
attempt to evade defeat.  What is often 
called Operational Preparation of the 
Environment (OPE) uses all national 
intelligence resources to gain and maintain 
an understanding of the operational 
environment and the adversary.  As 
Moltke wrote way back in 1880, “No plan 
survives first contact with the enemy.” 
Without the constant updating of the 
tactical, operational and strategic situation, 
planners and commanders cannot know if 
their plans have remained valid throughout 
the duration of the planning.  
Enhancing Realism in Wargaming 
Exercises 
There were four separate wargaming 
sessions during the Seskoau 2018 
academic year, each lasting a week long. 
Each wargame was structured around 
completing the fourteen MDMP steps, 
including the associated briefings and 
required written products. During the 
second wargaming session, students were 
assigned “white cell” or wargame 
creator/manager roles, learning how to 
organise a wargame. The third and fourth 
wargaming sessions were meant to be as 
comprehensive as possible, incorporating 
strategic, operational and tactical 
considerations to joint and combined 
operations.  
The key functions practiced in the 
MDMP wargaming were operations, 
intelligence, logistics, personnel, 
communications and electronics. The most 
significant influence to the wargame is the 
scenario, which at Seskoau is created 
beforehand and describes in depth the 
conflict background, road to war, troop 
dispositions, enemy capabilities and even 
desired military objective.  
Planning and executing wargaming 
training is a difficult task.  Wargaming is 
meant to highlight deficiencies in not only 
operational plans but deficiencies in 
operational knowledge.  The following 
highlights some strengths and weaknesses 
of Seskoau’s wargaming methods.   
First in the list of strengths, wargaming 
required 100% participation, regardless of 
student experience or operational 
knowledge.   The four wargaming sessions 
did build one on the other allowing 
students to develop a gradual 
understanding of the MDMP.   
Second, the training was very 
structured, following closely the MDMP.  
All students were able to follow the 
defined planning steps and understood 
what product or analysis was required for 
each step.  The wargaming sessions were 
meant to build on theory and doctrine 
already taught in class, to include 
analysing CoGs and weaponeering for a 
target (Rengunsista).   
Too much structure in a wargame can 
also lead to a number of weaknesses.  
Enforcing the strict fourteen-step process 
puts students in a mind-set to simply 
complete the deliverables and written 
submissions (products).  It becomes 
tempting to gloss over analysis.  However, 
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given the deliverables, some which can 
exceed three hundred pages, it is 
physically impossible to give quality time 
to analysis. Further, the assessment 
process too does not incentivize analysis, 
focussing more on the process and 
products. 
In addition, the wargaming construct 
attempted too much in too little time.  
Students were expected to think 
strategically, plan operationally and 
execute tactical tasks like weaponering 
(Rengunsista) aircraft for a single target.  
The MDPM is most beneficial when it 
takes on only one war level at a time per 
executing unit or authority.   
In terms of technological advances, 
Seskoau is in a transition between hard-
copy planning tools and computer software 
war-planning aids.  Sometimes, inordinate 
amounts of time were spent updating wall 
maps with static orders of battle.  The 
hands-on plotting system is useless in a 
dynamic battle environment; impossible to 
update given the kind of information flow 
that exists today.  Simulations must 
transfer to computer systems which can 
update and project enemy movements, 
highlight friendly force status and provide 
situation updates. Many of these tasks are 
automated in modern operations centres.  
A final critique of Seskoau’s 
wargaming is also related to its computer-
based communication system used to pass 
message traffic.  Such a system is capable 
of forcing dynamic responses from the 
players or encouraging a serious review of 
CoAs.  Instead, message traffic usually 
repeated the same data that was provided 
in the initial scenario.  Very rarely did 
intelligence injects require an immediate 
player response or any notable change in a 
pre-arranged CoAs.    
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this day and age, military campaigns 
requiring multinational force structures 
and considerations are a given.  Theory 
and doctrine do not always keep pace with 
realities.  Due to equipment constraints or 
political policy differences between 
countries, the doctrines that inform 
operations and strategy can rarely be 
applied universally.  But perhaps the 
biggest challenge to planning and 
executing a successful military campaign 
is first training realistically.   
This paper concludes, through 
participant observation at Indonesia’s 
premier Air Force education institution, 
case study and military doctrine analysis, 
that a country’s top-tier military 
institutions, especially countries that have 
not fought in a war for decades, must find 
a way to convert classroom education to 
realistic wargaming.   
One necessary addition to any 
institution’s curriculum is real-world 
examples – operational examples that do 
not shy away from discussing one’s 
mistakes.  The case studies of Desert 
Storm and Decisive Storm indicate that 
one’s own planning and execution errors 
also contain lessons learned that are 
potentially far more applicable to a 
nation’s fighting force than merely 
studying the history and even mistakes of 
others whose culture, politics, military 
capabilities and experience bear little 
resemblance to one’s own.  Indonesia’s 
military would do well to study theory and 
strategy but also be more self-critical, 
dissecting its own military activities and 
apply a more realistic environment to its 
training scenarios.   
Finally, this paper concludes that the 
purpose of studying theory is to enable the 
development of good doctrine, which in 
turn guides realistic training to enable the 
execution of a military campaign.  In the 
absence of recent operational experience, 
wargaming risks becoming a canned 
exercise in pageantry rather than one of 
critical analysis and creative problem-
solving. As the two war examples earlier 
explained, wargaming is not for show, but 
tangibly aids war preparation and 
readiness. 
Modern military campaigns are almost 
always joint operations and as such, 
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officers as junior as Captains and Majors 
should be exposed to quality education, 
training and exercises that is relevant to 
their nation’s strategic context.  Only by 
linking military doctrine with one’s own 
military and letting training facilitate 
quality analysis, dynamic realism, and 
creative military thinking, can a military 
learn to successfully plan and execute a 
military campaign.  The best militaries do 
not save a realistic application of MDMP 
for wartime only.  They train the way they 
would fight. 
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Attachment 1 – Joint Military Appreciation Process 
 
 
  
Figure 3. Flowchart Joint Military Appreciation Process used by the Australian and 
Malaysian Militaries. 
Source:  Australian Defence Force Publication 5.0.1 – Joint Military Appreciation 
Process. 
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Attachment 2 – KODAL in Operasi Desert Storm 
 
